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Abstract 
We present estimates of the demand for hunting licenses by residents and non residents in 
British Columbia for the period 1971–2000. We obtain estimates of both short-run and long- 
run price elasticities and discuss their revenue implications for future fee increases. We 
further find the demand by non residents to be strongly correlated with U.S. income variation 
over the business cycle; however, we find no such role for cyclical income variation for 
resident hunters. Finally, we demonstrate that hunters respond differently to conservation 
surcharges on hunting licenses relative to direct licensing charges, which has implications for 
policy makers introducing environmental surcharges in various contexts. 
 
Key Words: recreation demand; environmental surcharges; resource revenues and rent 
capture  
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Demand for Wildlife Hunting in British Columbia 
I. Introduction 
Wildlife game resources constitute an important source of economic well being in 
many jurisdictions, providing both use and non-use benefits to citizens. To prevent open 
access exploitation and potential extirpation of wildlife game resources, governments allocate 
take, and monitor and enforce hunting regulations. To do so, governments generally establish 
a system of hunting licenses. Often these consist of a general license and some form of 
species license that limits the potential harvest of a particular species, usually larger game. In 
many instances, these species licenses are sold on a “first-come, first-served” basis. In some 
cases, licenses to hunt prominent species, such as bighorn sheep or grizzly bears, are 
auctioned off so that the government collects the resource rent accruing to these animals. With 
the exception of auctions, hunting fees are generally not designed to capture the resource 
rents, but they often fail even to cover the operating costs of hunting programs and certainly 
not the spillover costs associated with hunting.
1 The broad purpose of the current paper is to 
examine the capture of wildlife resource rents in British Columbia.  
The problem of generating revenue for wildlife management is not unique to any 
jurisdiction. Numerous state fish and wildlife management agencies in the United States have 
previously experienced severe financial problems. While costs of providing wildlife 
management services had gone up for a variety of reasons, including greater demands by the 
                                                 
1 Spillover or externality costs refer to the effects of hunting on in situ (non-use) benefits (van Kooten, 
Stennes and Bulte 2001), restricting access for other recreationists during hunting season (for safety 
reasons), noise, incidental or accidental take of “wrong” animals (termed by-catch in the fishery 
literature), and so on.   2
public for protection of non-use values, revenues from user fees had fallen as a result of 
inflation and the failure of State legislators to increase fees (Reiling et al. 1980; LaPage 1981; 
Anderson et al. 1985). Many fish and wildlife agencies resolved their fiscal problems by 
lobbying state legislatures to increase license fees, using demand analysis to demonstrate that 
fee increases would be beneficial all around. Similar efforts are only now beginning to appear 
in Canada, even though funding challenges have been the same. 
In this paper, hunting data for the Province of British Columbia are used to examine 
the demand for hunting by both residents and non residents. Our objective is an empirical 
specification of these demand relationships suitable for assessing the revenue implications of 
variations in hunting license fees. For purposes of wildlife management and revenue 
generation, we are also interested in whether income variation is important, particularly the 
sensitivity of non resident demand to fluctuations in income. Finally, since BC charges 
hunters a wildlife conservation fee, it is of interest to gauge the response of hunters to this 
surcharge. Although in principle it acts simply to increase the hunting license fee, as a 
designated environmental surcharge it is possible that hunters may respond differently – and 
our results suggest this is indeed the case. This has direct implications concerning rent capture 
from wildlife as well as broader implications for the introduction of environmental 
conservation surcharges in other contexts. 
  We begin in the next section by examining hunting licenses and fees in British 
Columbia over the past three decades and using this information to specify our models of 
supply and demand for hunting. In Section 3, we present estimation results for a variety of 
different models of hunting demand. In section 4, we discuss the key results of the  empirical 
analysis, placing them in a broader policy context.   3
2. Modeling Demand for Hunting Licenses in British Columbia 
All hunters in British Columbia require a Basic hunting license, which by itself only 
permits small game hunting. For large game, individual Species licenses are also required. 
The fees for the Basic hunting licenses and Species licenses vary depending upon the age of 
the hunter, the residence of the hunter and, for the Species licenses, the type of animal 
involved. For Basic hunting licenses, there are separate fee schedules for juniors, adults and 
seniors. The Species licenses fees, however, are not differentiated by age. Both Basic and 
Species license fees are differentiated by place of residence: BC Resident, Canadian Non-BC 
Resident, and Non Canadian Resident. While in principle one could investigate quite narrow 
markets (e.g., demand for grizzly bear licenses by BC Resident juniors), our analysis 
considers two broadly defined markets, both of which are important sources of revenue for the 
British Columbia government. The first is the market for basic hunting licenses for adult BC 
Residents and the second is that for basic hunting licenses for adult Non Canadian Residents.
2 
For simplicity, we refer to these markets as Residents and Non Residents. Further, our best 
information concerning Non Residents is that they are primarily from the United States, 
which is how we treat this group in what follows.
3 
Figures 1 and 2 present the historical development of basic hunting license fees, both 
in real and nominal terms, and the numbers of such licenses sold for Residents and Non 
                                                 
2 Junior and senior aged hunters are excluded. 
3 This information is based upon discussions with the Ministry of Land, Air and Water Protection. 
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Residents.
4 An immediate conclusion from these figures is that hunting fees in British 
Columbia have not kept up with inflation, especially fees charged Non Resident hunters. For 
Non Residents, the depreciation of the Canadian dollar over the 1990s has contributed to the 
fall in real fees. The other interesting feature is the contrasting behaviour of the quantity of 
licenses purchased by Residents and Non Residents.  For Residents, the number of basic 
hunting licenses has trended downwards over time – from over 150,000 hunters in the early 
1970s to some 80,000 today. This has been noted in other studies of hunting demand and is 
generally attributed to changing attitudes toward hunting (see, e.g., Reiling et al. 1980). For 
Non Residents, there is no evidence of a secular decline in hunting. Although the number of 
licenses purchased falls during the 1970s, with a very large decline coincident with the large 
price increase of 1973–74, it has trended steadily upwards since 1982. 
It is also of some interest to consider how government revenues from licenses have 
fared over this period; Figure 3 presents estimated total revenue from the hunting fees across 
all categories and species (including animal royalties as discussed below). In 1974, as a result 
of a dramatic fee increase imposed on Non Residents (Figure 2) and a smaller increase on 
Residents (Figure 1), real and nominal revenues increased substantially. Since then, real 
revenues have remained relatively constant, declining somewhat during the late 1990s (after 
1994), while nominal revenues generally increased only to decline slightly after 1995. During 
the three decades from 1971 to 2000, nominal revenues increased by an average 8.3% per 
year, while real revenues increased by only 3.0% annually. 
There are two other types of fees hunters face in British Columbia. First, as already 
                                                 
4 The Resident fees are deflated by the Canadian CPI and those for Non Residents are deflated by the 
US CPI. Note that the Non Resident fees are set in Canadian dollars; values in Figure 2 have been 
converted to US dollars.   5
noted, a conservation surcharge is levied on all hunters in British Columbia purchasing a basic 
hunting license; a further conservation surcharge applies to the purchase of black and grizzly 
bear species licenses. The revenue is dedicated to the conservation of wildlife through the 
Habitat Conservation Trust Fund. The surcharge was first introduced in the 1984/85 fiscal 
year at $C3 for Residents and Non Residents alike. It was increased in 1989-90 to $C5 for 
Residents and $C30 for Non Residents. Since then, these surcharges have remained 
unchanged so that in real terms they have eroded over time.  
Second, Non Resident hunters are required to employ a guide outfitter.
5 Guides are 
legally liable to pay royalties for animals taken by Non Resident hunters, but the royalties are 
typically passed on to the guided hunter. Royalties were introduced in 1982 and are imposed 
on ten major mammal species; they currently range from $C25 for wolves to $C600 for 
grizzly bears. In principle, these royalties act as an additional expected cost to hunting these 
species and should, when increased, reduce the demand for hunting licenses.  
2.1 Demand and Supply of Hunting Licenses 
In general terms, we can specify the demand for hunting licenses as: 
(1)  ht = h(ft, mt, ht-1, zt, t), 
where ft is a vector of license fees at time t that may bear on the purchase of a basic license, mt 
is a measure of income, zt is a vector of other factors (e.g., age, gender, other costs associated 
with hunting, price and availability of other leisure activities), and t is a time trend that takes 
into account long-term secular trends that may influence hunting activity. We also include a 
lagged dependent variable, ht-1, for two possible (related) reasons. First, like many 
                                                 
5 With the exception of Non Resident hunters accompanied by a blood relative who is a BC Resident.    6
consumption goods, there is likely to be a degree of persistence in the purchase of hunting 
licenses from year to year – behavior is influenced in part by habit. Alternatively, it may 
capture factors related to the positive or negative experience from hunting in the previous 
period. Imagine one year is particularly good for hunting, say due to weather conditions, and 
this motivates high current demand. In the following year, because of the good conditions 
previously, hunting demand is again higher than otherwise. 
According to the Ministry responsible for setting all fees for hunting licenses, the 
supply of licenses is perfectly elastic in any one year at the fees set by the Ministry. There are 
no restrictions on the quantity of licenses sold once the fee has been established. Over time, 
license fees are adjusted; however, there is no evidence that the pricing decisions are 
influenced in any way by possible determinants of demand. Our best understanding is that 
fees have been set on the basis of political and budget considerations, with little or no 
reference to the market for hunting licenses. On this basis, we are confident that we can treat 
the license fees as exogenous variables in our model and estimate the demand for licenses 
directly using equation (1). 
A number of other estimation issues arise. First, hunting is only one of many activities 
and is therefore affected by prices of other consumer goods. We address this by specifying all 
fees in real terms deflated by the consumer price index. For the Resident models, we use the 
Canadian CPI. For the Non Resident models, we use the US CPI after first converting the fees 
to US dollar values. (We do not explicitly identify the exchange rate adjustment in the 
formulas below.) As long as these other prices have tended to rise more or less with the CPI, 
this is a reasonable first approximation. Similarly, we have no information on other costs 
associated with hunting, such as fixed costs of equipment (vehicles, rifles, tents, special   7
clothing, etc.) and variable costs of travel, ammunition and so on.
6 A second and somewhat 
related concern is the lack of data concerning individual characteristics that might affect 
demand, such as gender and socio-economic characteristics of hunters. This information is not 
collected and maintained by the BC government so it is not possible to include in our analysis.  
The next issue to address is the measurement of fees. For Resident hunters, the 
demand for a basic hunting license will depend upon the basic license fee, denoted fbt. 
Demand also depends upon species license fees, denoted fsit for species i. In effect, Basic and 
Species licenses are complementary goods. Because there are a number of Species licenses 
and because Species license fees are co-linear as they are typically adjusted all together, it is 
not possible to include these individually in our empirical models. Instead, we construct a 
simple geometric index over the N categories of species defined as follows: 
(2)  fst = 
N
i t p it fs
/ 1 ) / ( ∏  
where pt is the consumer price index.  
Finally, the conservation surcharge, denoted cst, is an additional cost to purchasing a 
basic hunting license. (It too is deflated by the CPI.) While it would be natural simply to add 
this to the license fee, which we do consider, it is of interest to consider whether demand 
responds differently to the surcharge. If hunters truly believe that the surcharge will be used to 
fund wildlife conservation, their response to variation in this surcharge may differ relative to 
their response to general fee increases. There are two possible related explanations for this. 
First, habitat conservation may be viewed as an alternative public good for which there is a 
willingness to pay, irrespective of current and future expected use. A second, somewhat more 
                                                 
6 Ward and Beal (2000) for example introduce travel costs in their modeling of demand for recreation, 
which is a useful direction for further research, particularly for Non Resident demand.   8
sophisticated argument is that hunters treat these types of charges as an option price related to 
the option value of the hunting experience available in the future, given that future availability 
of the hunting experience (supply of adequate wildlife game animals) is uncertain (Graham-
Tomasi, 1995). Our data set does not allow us to discriminate between these two explanations, 
but we are able to examine whether the response to increase in the surcharge is the same as to 
general fee increases. Whether or not this is the case is of some relevance for environmental 
policy more generally. 
Identical considerations apply to the model for Non Resident licenses with one 
additional aspect. Non Residents must pay royalties, either directly or indirectly, on large 
game taken. As with the Species Licenses, it is necessary to construct an index of these 
royalties, which is defined as 
(3)  frt = 
N
i t p it fr
/ 1 ) / ( ∏ , 
where frit is the royalty fee for species i. As with the species licenses, this is a price index for a 
good complementary to the basic license. It is dependent, however, on a successful hunt. If 
the subjective probability of a successful hunt varies substantially over time, it is not possible 
to identify a price response to variation in royalty costs.  
The other variables included in the model are the de-trended of per capita disposable 
incomes (measured in real terms, deflated by the CPI), denoted yt, and a linear trend. Per 
capita disposable income is de-trended using the band pass filter described in Baxter and King 
(1999). This filter is designed to extract the business cycle frequency component of economic 
time series. Following Baxter and King, we define the business cycle frequency to be between   9
2–8 years.
7 
We expect that hunting is positively related to individuals’ disposable income. Over 
the sample period 1971-2000, this can manifest itself in two ways. First, over the sample there 
has been a secular increase in the per capita disposable income of both residents and non-
residents of British Columbia. This may well contribute to a secular increase in the demand 
for hunting; as individuals become wealthier they are likely to increase their consumption of 
leisure activities such as hunting. Confounding this, however, is a possible secular move away 
from hunting as a leisure activity over our sample period. The linear trend in the model in 
principle captures the net effect of both these contributions to hunting license demand.  
The second way in which income may contribute to hunting license demand is through 
cyclical fluctuations. It seems very likely that during periods of strong economic growth – 
periods when per capita income is above trend – demand for hunting may be relatively high. 
Conversely, during periods of unusually low economic growth, demand for hunting may be 
relatively low.
8 For this reason, we include a measure of the cyclical variation of per capita 
income. An alternative and more common strategy would be simply to include the level of per 
capita disposable income directly into the regression (assuming a log linear demand 
specification). With a linear trend in such a model, this is equivalent to including linearly de-
trended income. We chose not to do this, however, because this is often a poor way of 
obtaining business cycle fluctuations of aggregate income data. In our case, it works 
                                                 
7 See data appendix for details of series construction. 
8 This is not the only reasonable conjecture, particularly for BC residents where hunting may have 
relatively low costs (e.g., no significant travel). It is possible that during recessionary periods, the 
opportunity cost of leisure may be low, increasing the demand for hunting. Similarly, during 
expansionary periods, the opportunity cost of leisure may be quite high causing hunters to forgo 
recreational activity.   10
particularly badly for British Columbia income. As this is somewhat non standard, the de-
trended income series is presented in Figure 4. 
2.2 Empirical model 
For estimation purposes, we consider a log-linear version of equation (1). For the two 
markets, our general models are as follows: 
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where we have introduced the superscript notation R and NR to discriminate between 
Resident and Non Resident variables. 
R
t u  and 
NR
t u  are assumed to be mean zero innovations. 
While ideally we would like these to be independently and identically distributed, this does 
not appear to be the case; consequently, we use the Newey and West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust covariance estimator for inference.
9 
We also consider alternative assumptions on the fee variables. For the resident model, 
we consider two combined fees: 
  Combined Fee 1 = ln( ) fb fs t
R
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For the Non Resident model, the two combined fees are:  
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9 We cannot reject the hypothesis of serial correlation of order two in many of our models. While 
modeling this directly is desirable, we chose not to do so because of our limited sample.   11
For both Resident and Non Resident models, the first combination fee assumes that the basic 
license fee and the associated fees for hunting larger game (species fees and royalties) can be 
aggregated to provide one general fee. The second combined fee makes the assumption that 
the conservation charge is treated by hunters as simply an additional charge for hunting. 
3. Empirical Results 
We estimate equations (4) and (5) and various restricted versions of these models over 
the sample 1971–2000. Data sources and construction are provided in the Appendix. The 
results are reported in Tables 1–3. Models that use the unrestricted fee structure are identified 
as R1 and N1 for Resident and Non Resident, respectively. Models that use Combined Fee 1 
are identified as R2 and N2; those that use Combined Fee 2 as R3 and N3. 
3.1 Resident Results 
Results for the Resident models are reported in Table 1. A number of common results 
are worth highlighting. First, in all cases the lagged dependent variable is positive, quite large 
and statistically significant. We interpret this as evidence of habit in consumption behaviour.
10 
Second, as we might expect from Figure 1, we observe a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on the trend term, consistent with a secular movement away from hunting. Third, 
in all cases the coefficient on cyclical disposable income is statistically insignificant 
indicating a zero income (cyclical) elasticity of demand for hunting licenses by BC Residents. 
                                                 
10 An obvious explanation for the results in Table 1 is that Resident hunting license demand is well 
described by a unit root with drift in contrast to our implicit assumption that it is trend stationary. We 
did experiment with models in first differences but were unable to obtain any useful relationship 
between quantity and price for hunting licenses. The difficulty of discriminating between first 
difference and trend stationarity in small samples is well known.    12
Finally, all of the models reported in Table 1 have very high adjusted R-squared values. This 
should not, however, be taken as strong evidence in favour of these models; much of the fit is 
determined by the linear trend term and the strongly significant lagged dependent variable 
term. 
Turning to the fee variables, when we include all of the fees in an unrestricted fashion 
(model R1), we obtain a statistically significant short-run elasticity estimate of -0.30 on the 
basic license fee; in contrast, the two other fee variables are statistically insignificant. Model 
R1' amends R1 by dropping the species index while Model R1'' drops the remaining 
insignificant variables. Across these three models the elasticity coefficient on the basic license 
fee appears to be reasonably stable, around or just below -0.3. 
One way to interpret the results of R1–R1'' is that the demand for basic hunting 
licenses by Residents is only sensitive to the basic license fee; it is insensitive to the species 
index fee – the price of a complementary good – as well as to the conservation surcharge. For 
the species index, we may be simply expecting too much from an aggregate fee index, one 
which may not be relevant for many purchasers of basic licenses (i.e., those not involved in 
large game hunting). The conservation surcharge, however, is more directly related to the 
basic license fee paid by all hunters. The results in R1–R1'' indicate that the surcharge is not 
treated by hunters as simply an additional charge to hunting, possibly because they view it as 
a price paid for an alternative complementary good (wilderness conservation or the option 
value of future hunting). We can test this formally by asking whether the elasticity on the 
surcharge in regressions R1 and R1' evaluated at the mean (recall the surcharge is entered into 
the regression in levels) is statistically different from that on the basic license fee. Not 
surprisingly, given the estimates reported, we strongly reject this hypothesis. (Marginal   13
significance levels for this test are reported for each model in the “ Equality of elasticities” 
row.) 
An alternative interpretation of the results in R1–R1'' is that the fee variables are co-
linear and it is difficult to obtain precise information about the contribution of each 
component of the hunting fees. To address this, we consider the combined fees defined 
previously. Model R2 combines the basic license fee and the species index; R3 combines 
these fees with the conservation surcharge. In both cases, the elasticity coefficient is 
statistically significant although now somewhat smaller in absolute value, around -0.19. The 
elasticity coefficient is also stable across the specifications reported in R2' and R3', which 
remove the statistically insignificant variables from R2 and R3. The most interesting result 
from these models concerns the conservation surcharge in R2. The coefficient on the 
surcharge, while negative, is insignificantly different from zero, evidence that the surcharge is 
not treated as a simple additional charge to hunting. As before, when we test the equality of 
elasticities between the combined fee and the surcharge elasticity in R2 we strongly reject the 
null hypothesis of equality. For completeness, the elasticity estimate from model R2 for the 
conservation surcharge, evaluated at the mean, is -0.01. 
On the basis of model fit, it is not possible to discriminate between the models of 
Table 1. Nor is it possible to test directly whether the aggregation of the fees in R2 and R3 is 
appropriate, since the combined fees are not testable parameter restrictions on the more 
general model R1. What we can do is consider non-nested hypothesis tests (Davidson and 
Mackinnon 1994). These tests are reported in Table 3. We consider three possible models: 
R1'', R2', and R3'. If our null hypothesis is R1'' when we include the information from either 
R2' or R3' (i.e., the predicted values from these models are included in model R1''), we are   14
unable to reject R1'' – evidence in favour of R1'' and the disaggregate fee variables. In 
contrast, when either R2' or R3' is the null hypothesis tested against R1'', we can weakly reject 
(between 10 and 15 percent marginal significance levels) these two hypotheses. The last set of 
tests reported are for the hypotheses R2' and R3' against each other, where it is not possible to 
reject either hypothesis against the other. These results taken together provide some evidence 
in favour of the disaggregated model R1''. This further supports the conclusion that the 
conservation surcharge can appropriately be treated as having a zero elasticity, distinct from 
the basic license fee elasticity of between -0.2 and -0.3. 
Finally, we can consider the long run elasticities on the fee variables from the models 
in Table 1, as well as the implications of both the short- and long-run elasticities for revenue 
maximization. To calculate long-run elasticities, we divide the short-run elasticity by one 
minus the lagged dependent variable coefficient. This number is reported for each model at 
the bottom of Table 1. These elasticity estimates vary somewhat across the models and fee 
definitions. For the basic license, if we take model R1'' as our preferred specification, we 
obtain a long-run elasticity of -0.95; alternatively, on the combined fees we get a long-run 
elasticity of about -0.80. Underneath these estimates are marginal significance levels for two 
hypothesis tests: (1) that the long-run elasticity is zero; and (2) that the long-run elasticity is 
minus one, or unit elasticity. In all cases, we reject (1) and fail to reject (2) . 
The elasticity results have a direct revenue implications for the government in setting 
hunting licenses fees. Our best estimates suggest that, in the short run, the demand for hunting 
licenses by Residents is inelastic. As a consequence, in the short run there will be an increase 
in revenues associated with an increase in fees. Over the longer term, however, because the 
long-run elasticities are close to minus one, fee increases on Resident licenses are likely to be   15
revenue neutral. More precisely, we cannot reject the hypothesis that a fee increase for 
Resident licenses will be revenue neutral in the long run. 
For completeness and as a check as to whether certain observations are influential to 
the estimation of the Resident demand curve, particularly with regard to the fee elasticity 
coefficient, it is useful consider a plot of the (short-run) demand curve of model R'' (our 
preferred specification). To do so, we first obtain the residuals from two regressions: (1) the 
quantity variable against all regressors excluding the fee variable, and (2) the fee variable 
against all remaining regressors. This strips out all other variation and captures only the 
variation between fees and quantities; that is, the demand curve for these licenses. These 
residuals are plotted in Figure 5, along with the regression line for these two variables (with 
slope -0.26, by construction, identical to that reported in Table 1). One immediate concern is 
whether the 1974 observation, which appears to be quite influential, is dominating the 
estimation. To examine this, we consider the demand curve if we drop this pair of residuals; 
as is evident from Figure 5, this has little bearing on the relationship between quantity of 
licenses and fees. 
3.2 Non Resident Results 
Table 2 reports a similar modeling exercise for Non Residents licenses. As before, we 
first consider a disaggregate fee structure with some further refinements, models N1–N1'', and 
then consider the combination of Non Resident fees (defined above) in models N2 and N3.  
As with the Resident models, we observe a positive and significant coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable. For these models, it is somewhat smaller, ranging from 0.37 to 
0.60 depending upon the specification, but still suggests a fair degree of persistence in hunting   16
license demand by Non Residents. In contrast to the Resident model, we get quite different 
results for the trend and the cyclical per capita disposable income variable. In the case of the 
trend, no stable result emerges across the models. If we focus on the models that have been 
simplified (i.e., those with insignificant variables removed), then the trend coefficient is 
statistically insignificant, consistent with our visual inspection of the hunting license data for 
Non Residents (Figure 2). Further, in contrast to the Resident models, we observe strong and 
statistically significant income elasticity coefficients, ranging from 3.70 to 4.69 (with long-
run elasticities somewhat larger). Evidently, there is a strong cyclical component to hunting 
demand by Non Residents. 
The fee coefficients or elasticity estimates follow a similar pattern to those for the 
Resident models. When we consider all of the fees (or fee indices) individually, we do not 
obtain much useful information; some of the coefficients are incorrectly signed while others 
are statistically insignificant. As the basic license fee is the most direct and applicable price 
measure, we first consider keeping this in the model and dropping the species and royalty 
index, model N1'. Here we obtain a statistically significant basic fee elasticity of -0.28, fairly 
similar to that for Residents. Again, the conservation surcharge coefficient is statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that the conservation surcharge has no effect on hunting license 
demand. Model N1'' drops the surcharge to obtain a preferred specification for demand which, 
in summary, has a fair degree of persistence, a short-run inelastic price response and a strong 
cyclical income elasticity. 
Inspection of Figure 2 suggests a natural experiment to check the elasticity estimates 
from Table 2. Between 1973 and 1974, basic license fees rose by approximately 175 percent 
while the quantity of licenses fell by approximately 43 percent, giving an elasticity at this   17
point of approximately -0.24, very similar to the estimates in Table 2. Of course, this ignores 
changes in the other determinants and information from the rest of the sample but it is 
encouraging that the large swing in price and quantity in 1974 is consistent with our model. 
An obvious concern, however, is that this observation is very influential.  
As with the Resident demand, we can plot the relationship between fees and quantities 
implied by the regression (i.e., the residuals after fees and quantities have been projected onto 
the other regressors). This relationship for model N1'' is reported in Figure 6. Clearly, two 
observations are influential: 1972 and 1974, as suspected. If we remove these observations, 
the slope coefficient is considerably smaller, approximately -0.09. To the extent that the fee 
rise in 1974 is valuable information, it doesn’t seem sensible to exclude these observations 
from our analysis; however, the importance of this and other influential observations should 
be borne in mind. 
The results for the combined fees are quite similar. The price elasticity is somewhat 
less, approximately -0.22, as is the income elasticity, which is now approximately 4.00. The 
conservation surcharge when included (model N2) is again statistically insignificant. If we 
consider the adjusted R-squared statistics, there appears to be some evidence in favour of the 
combined fee models, although the difference is not that great. As before, we consider non- 
nested hypothesis tests to discriminate between these models (see Table 3). The results tend to 
favour N2' and N3 over N1'', though it is not possible to discriminate between N2' and N3' on 
the basis of these tests. So in contrast to the Resident models, the evidence favours the 
combined fee models, possibly treating the conservation surcharge as simply an additional 
component of the total license fee. 
The long-run elasticities also provide different conclusions relative to the Resident   18
models. First, they are much smaller in value, ranging from -0.66 for model N1'' to -0.43 for 
models N2' and N3. As before, these estimates are all statistically different from zero. 
Moreover, for models N2' and N3 these are statistically different from minus one, unit 
elasticity (marginal significance levels of 0.000). For model N1'', we can reject a unit 
elasticity coefficient at a marginal significance level of 0.15. The weight of evidence suggests 
that the demand for hunting licenses by Non Residents is inelastic both in the short- and long- 
run, indicating that an increase in fees would increase revenues for the British Columbia 
government. 
Finally, for completeness Figure 7 reports the estimated demand curve for model N3, 
our (weakly) preferred specification. As with model N1'', 1972 and 1974 are very influential 
observations. If we drop these observations, then the fee elasticity is again considerably less, 
approximately -0.10. As discussed previously, it is not obvious that we wish to discard the 
information from these outliers, particularly the 1974 fee rise. Note also that if we do discount 
these observations we are left with the conclusion that Non Resident demand is even more 
inelastic than the estimates presented in Table 2. 
4. Discussion 
A number of interesting points merit further discussion. First, for both the Resident 
and Non Resident models, we use a measure of cyclical variation in per capita disposable 
income as a determinant of hunting license demand. This is designed to capture the influence 
of short-run fluctuations in income in contrast to the general increase in real per capita 
disposable income occurring over time. The latter is difficult to identify because of the other 
trend influences on hunting, particularly the recognized movement away from hunting as a   19
leisure activity. Interestingly, we obtain very different results for Residents versus Non 
Residents and, moreover, these results are not too difficult to explain. Non Resident hunting 
demand is pro-cyclical, making it similar to other tourism activities.
11 Non Residents are 
likely to incur significant fixed travel costs to hunt in BC; moreover, as Non Residents are 
likely to have other less expensive hunting alternatives, they are more likely to travel to BC to 
hunt large game, which is relatively expensive. In contrast, Residents hunting demand is not 
cyclical. As the costs of hunting are much smaller for Residents, both for fees and fixed travel 
costs, it seems reasonable that the general demand for basic hunting licenses is less likely to 
depend upon transitory fluctuations in disposable income. We might conjecture that the 
margin affected by cyclical income variation for Residents is the demand for more expensive 
game, an issue we leave for future research. 
The second point of interest concerns the elasticity results and the implications for 
revenues. If demand is inelastic then an increase in price will raise revenues. Similarly, if 
demand is elastic revenue will decrease with an increase in price, while, with unit elasticity, 
revenue is unaffected by changes in prices. Our results suggest that raising fees for Residents 
may raise revenues in the short run, but is likely to be revenue neutral in the longer run. In 
contrast, it appears possible to increase government revenues from the sale of Non Resident 
licenses. This is likely to be particularly appealing to the BC government since these hunters 
have no direct political constituency, although the effect on guides and outfitters must be 
borne in mind. Perhaps more importantly, the inelastic or unitary elastic hunting demand is 
                                                 
11 Empirical studies of tourism generally include an income component, as would seem reasonable. In 
a recent study for Australia, Lim and McAleer (2001) use cointegration to model tourism demand. In 
addition to finding a long-run relationship between tourism and income, for one of the countries they 
identify significant dynamic effects, which can be loosely interpreted as similar to our cyclical 
variation.   20
potentially useful for wildlife management since it suggests that if reduced hunting is 
warranted for wildlife conservation purposes,  higher fees can be imposed to reduce hunting 
without detrimental effects on license revenue. Of course, it is necessary to be careful about 
all such statements. While the log linear specification we use may be a reasonable local 
approximation, it may not be so in all instances, particularly if significant fee raises are being 
considered. As well, higher fees may also affect compliance, leading to more instances of 
unlicensed hunting and unreported kills (loss of royalty revenues). 
Finally, we consider the response of hunting demand to the introduction and 
subsequent increases in a conservation surcharge, the proceeds from which are dedicated to 
the conservation of wildlife through the Habitat Conservation Trust Fund. Our results point to 
some specific and general conclusions for governments setting environmental charges as 
additional fees to resource use. Specific to our data, we find no evidence that variation in the 
conservation surcharge has had much impact on hunting demand by Residents or Non 
Residents. For Residents, it appears to have zero elasticity. For Non Residents, it may 
arguably have a non zero elasticity but overall demand is fee inelastic. This suggests that for 
British Columbia there is further scope to raise revenue for wildlife conservation in this 
manner. 
More generally, we interpret the result on the conservation surcharge as evidence that, 
although the charge is levied as a simple additional cost to all hunting licenses, it is treated 
differently by all hunters. One interpretation is that it is viewed as the price of an alternative 
public good, wildlife conservation, one with very inelastic demand (consistent with the small 
magnitude of the surcharge). Alternatively, it may be that hunters treat these charges as an 
option price to retain the option of hunting experience available in the future.  Option demand   21
appears to be quite inelastic. Where this matters for policy makers is assessing the impact on 
resource use from introducing such a charge. To assess the impact of an environmental 
surcharge both on participation as well as on revenues generated requires some measure of 
demand response. The natural candidate is an elasticity of demand estimate based upon 
previous price variation. Our results suggest that elasticity measures associated with usage 
fees do not provide a useful measure in this regard; there would be a tendency to overestimate 
the effect on demand from such charges. We suspect that this result may be quite general and 
it argues for further empirical work evaluating the effects of environmental surcharges applied 
to resource usage. 
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Data Appendix 
Hunting Licenses and Fees 
All of the hunting fee and licenses purchased data are provided by the British Columbia 
Ministry of Land, Water and Air Protection. This data is proprietary though in some instances 
it may be possible to obtain the data upon request from the authors. 
Consumer Price Indices 
Residents: Canada Consumer Price Index (CPI), 1996 Basket, Monthly. CANSIM II Series 
V735319. Series is averaged to obtain annual series. 
Non Residents: US Consumer Prices Monthly. International Financial Statistics 
[11164…ZF…]. Series is averaged to obtain annual series.  
Exchange Rate 
Canada US Dollar Exchange rate. CANSIM II Series V37426. Monthly series is averaged to 
obtain annual series. 
Per Capita Disposable Personal Income 
Both Residents and Non Residents series are constructed using aggregate measures of 
personal disposable income divided by total population. The series are then put into real terms 
by deflating using the CPI indices identified above. 
Residents:  
(i)  BC Personal Disposable Income is constructed from two annual series: (1) 
CANSIM I Series D45164 (1948–1996) and (2) CANSIM II Series V691726 
(1981–2002).  The two series are spliced by using the CANSIM I series up until   24
1980. 
(ii)  Population data is constructed from two annual series: (1) Persons; British 
Columbia. CANSIM I Series D31245 (1948–1995) and (2) British Columbia Both 
Sexes All Ages. CANSIM II Series V469818 (1971–2002). The two series are 
spliced by using the CANSIM I series up until 1970. 
Non Residents:  
(i)  United States; Disposable Personal Income: CANSIM II Series V122016. Data are 
seasonally adjusted quarterly data at annual rates. Annual series is constructed by 
averaging quarterly data. 
(ii)  Population data is from the International Financial Statistics [11199Z..ZF...]. 
Construction of Cyclical Income Measures 
The per capita real disposable income series for both Residents and Non Residents are filtered 
using the approximation to the Band Pass filter described in Baxter and King (1999). The 
moving average length is set to two. The business cycle frequency is defined to be 2–8 years, 
which is standard in the macroeconomics literature. The income series are constructed over 
the period 1948 to 2002 and it is these series that are filtered. In constructing the filtered data, 
we lose the first and last two observations, so the series we work with are defined over 1950–
2000.   25
Table 1: British Columbia Residents Models 
  Dependent variable: Quantity of Basic Licences (log) 
Explanatory Variables   R1   R1′   R1′′   R2   R2′    R3   R3′ 


































     
Species price index (log)   0.0011
 0.0527
       






    
































2 R    0.9661  0.9675  0.9673  0.9611  0.9636   0.9632   0.9644
         
Equality of elasticities   0.0087  0.0002 –   0.0045 –  –  – 























         
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by OLS. The sample is 1971-2000. The number of observations is 29. Combined 
Fee 1 combines the basic license fee and the species price index. Combined Fee 2 combines the basic license fee, 
the species price index and the conservation surcharge. Numbers below coefficient estimates are Newey and West 
(1987) standard errors calculated using a lag truncation parameter of two. Equality of elasticities reports the 
marginal significance levels for an F-test of the equality between the elasticity of the surcharge and the basic 
license fee or, where relevant, the combined fee. The numbers below the long run elasticities estimates are 
marginal significance levels for (1) an F-test of the null hypothesis that the long run elasticity estimates are equal to 
zero; and (2) that the long-run elasticity estimates are equal to minus one. 
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Table 2: Non Residents 
  Dependent variable: Quantity of Basic Licences (log) 
Explanatory Variables   N1   N1′   N1′′ N2  N2′ N3   































    
Species price index (log)  -0.1788 
0.0409 
      







Royalties index  -0.0022 
0.0022 
      





Combined Fee 2 (log)         -0.2189 
 0.0455 
























2 R   0.8995 0.8383 0.8419 0.8831  0.8879    0.8883 
          
Equality of elasticities  0.0823 0.0397 – 0.0004  –  – 


















          
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by OLS. The sample is 1971-2000. The number of observations is 29. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of number of hunting licenses. Combined Fee 1 combines the basic license fee, 
the species price index, and the royalty index. Combined Fee 2 combines the basic license fee, the species price 
index, the royalty index and the conservation surcharge. Coefficients are estimated by OLS. Numbers below 
coefficient estimates are Newey and West (1987) standard errors calculated using a lag truncation parameter of 
two. Equality of elasticities reports the marginal significance levels for an F-test of the equality between the 
elasticity of the surcharge and the basic license fee or, where relevant, the combined fee. The numbers below the 
long run elasticities estimates are marginal significance levels for (1) an F-test of the null hypothesis that the long 
run elasticity estimates are equal to zero; and (2) that the long-run elasticity estimates are equal to minus one. 
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Table 3: Non-Nested Tests 
 
BC Residents Models  Non Residents Models 
Hypotheses R1′′ and R2′   Hypotheses  N1′′ and N2′   
Null: R1′′ 
 












-1.006   
0.325 
Hypotheses R1′′ and R3′    Hypotheses N1′′ and N3   
Null: R1′′ 
 












-1.562   
0.132 
Hypotheses R2′ and R3′    Hypotheses N2′ and N3   
Null: R2′ 
 












0.123   
0.903 
Notes: Numbers below coefficient estimate are marginal significance levels, based on the Newey and West 
(1987) covariance estimator, for a two-sided t-test on the predicted values of the alternative hypothesis included 
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Full Sample less 1972, 1974 
DemandFigure 7: Estimated Demand Curve N3
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